Optional Preferential Party Vote

Introduction

The MMP system used in New Zealand is largely based on that introduced in Germany in the aftermath of the Second World War, with some differences in detail driven largely by the much greater size of Germany's Bundestag compared to our House of Representatives. One of the characteristics shared by both variants of the system is the requirement of a party to cross one of two thresholds in order to qualify for receiving an allocation of list MPs.

In essence, the party must either get at least 5% of all valid party votes cast, or have a certain number of its electorate candidates win their electorates (one in New Zealand, three in Germany).

The 5% threshold was sold to the Germans as necessary in light of the failure of the Weimar Republic. That unhappy State, an early experiment in nearly pure proportional representation, contended with legislative paralysis as the social and economic stresses of the time caused people to turn to fringe parties. Frustration with that paralysis, according to popular history, led to Germans electing Nazi and Communist representatives in large numbers, and ultimately to the Third Reich.

Constitution-drafters concluded that the best way to prevent that kind of paralysis was to erect a statutory barrier to small parties gaining seats in the legislature. It wasn't a complete barrier, since the electorate seat threshold provides a workaround. But the history of the thirty years of MMP in New Zealand shows that not a single party has won a seat in Parliament at an election without either the party itself, or the party leader, having had a previous seat in the House.

• New Zealand First was formed and led by a former National MP.
• ACT, the Alliance, United Future, the Maori Party and Jim Anderton's Progressive Party were all formed and initially led by former Labour MPs.
• The Greens gained parliamentary representation as part of the Alliance before they broke away.

It has also been suggested that the 5% threshold prevents parties with "extremist views" from gaining seats in the House. This language should be avoided in a democracy in any case, because the implication of the term is that the only reason for a party to lack support is that there is something repugnant about its policies — and conversely, that any policy of a party enjoying widespread support must be worth taking seriously.

The real effect of the 5% threshold is not to block parties with horrible policies from gaining seats, even quite numerous seats, in the House. It's to discourage voters from casting votes for a party that lacks Parliamentary representation, on the unfortunately true grounds that any such vote will be wasted. Instead, the incentive is for a voter to vote for an established party, however poorly the voter thinks the established party holds or represents his or her actual views.

The largest group of systematically disenfranchised Parliamentary electors in New Zealand is the group who collectively vote for parties that don't cross the 5% threshold or win an electorate seat. The votes of people who vote for a losing candidate for an electorate seat are at least counted; and they send a signal to the winner as to how strong his competition is, and how secure he should feel. The votes of those who vote for small parties are all but literally thrown away.

Such disenfranchisement has no place in a democracy.

But we don't want a Weimar Republic style fragmented Parliament either. How to fix this?

In the New Zealand tradition of electoral experiments, I propose the Optional Preferential Party Vote.

What is Preferential Voting?

Preferential Voting is implemented in various jurisdictions around the world, most especially in Australia and in its states and territories. In essence, the voter ranks candidates — or, in the case of this proposal, political parties — in order from 1 (the most preferred) to whatever number is the lowest.

How would preferential voting work with the threshold?

Quite simply. As long as any party remaining is a candidate for elimination — that is, at least one party doesn't hold an electorate seat and has less than 5% of valid party votes cast (the total of 100% always including exhausted ballots) — the smallest such party still in the count is eliminated, and its votes distributed according to the next-highest preferences expressed on its ballots. Those ballots with no further preferences expressed go in the Exhausted pile. The Exhausted pile is allowed to remain no matter how small it is.

Once all ballots have been distributed in this way, it follows that every party still in the count will have either an electorate seat, or at least 5% of the valid party votes after distribution of preferences.

So what's this Optional business?

A voter needn't cast a fully preferential vote in which every party has a preference assigned. The voter could number only three parties, say, or two, or even just one. In fact, there's no reason a voter couldn't just tick his or her preferred party, just as is done now, and the counters treat that vote as a first-preference vote for that party with no contingent preferences expressed.

Obviously, such a voter takes the risk that his or her preferred party won't be elected, and that ballot will therefore be a wasted vote. Then again, the voter might truly think that all other parties are effectively the same as far as he or she is concerned.

How would OPPV help?

A voter could cast a vote for a small party, not currently represented in the House, secure that if that party doesn't get in, his or her vote would transfer to whichever larger party the voter wanted.

Small parties that are represented in the House, but only because a larger party has done a deal with them (gifting the small party leader an electorate seat, for instance) would be able to more securely compete against the larger party for campaigning purposes, and in the House in between elections.

The effect of this change would be to improve democratic competition. Small parties with popular policies would pose a real threat to established parties. The established parties might then have to adopt those policies and actually put them into effect, or else make an intelligible case as to why the policy, however popular it may be, is against the interests of New Zealand.

But OPPV could still return as many as 19 or 20 parties to Parliament!

Theoretically, yes. But is that likely, given the traditional desire of New Zealanders for strong, stable government?

But if you're really worried about that, then instead of setting a 5% threshold, set a "maximum number of parties" threshold: perhaps somewhere between six and eight parties. Enough for a few small parties to get in. The important thing is the ability to transfer one's vote according to preferences.

Would we have to do preferential voting for electorate seats too?

Of course not, but we could if we wanted to!