NZ Constitutional Reform (2023)

Introduction The MMP system used in New Zealand is largely based on that introduced in Germany in the aftermath of the Second World War, with some differences in detail driven largely by the much greater size of Germany's Bundestag compared to our House of Representatives. One of the characteristics shared by both variants of the system is the requirement of a party to cross one of two thresholds in order to qualify for receiving an allocation of list MPs. In essence, the party must either  get at least 5% of all valid party votes cast, or  have a certain number of its electorate candidates win their electorates (one in New Zealand, three in Germany). The 5% threshold was sold to the Germans as necessary in light of the failure of the Weimar Republic. That unhappy State, an early experiment in nearly pure proportional representation, contended with legislative paralysis as the social and economic stresses of the time caused people to turn to fringe parties. Frustration with that p

The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is well established in New Zealand, and derives, more or less, from British constitutional practice in the 18th and 19th centuries. In practical terms, it means that Parliament — in effect, the House of Representatives, which is inevitably dominated by the government of the day — can pass any laws it likes, including constitutional changes that fundamentally change the nature of the relationship between the government and the governed. There is, of course, a good historical reason why Parliamentary sovereignty came to exist. In earlier (medieval and pre-industrial) times, when education and literacy were much less widespread than they now are, and when the lower classes had hardly any political rights or duties beyond the lord of their manor, limiting political life at the national level to the nobility, the landed gentry, and the wealthy merchants of the towns made sense. They were also the only ones who could really afford to travel to Westmi

This is a collection of proposals, in blog form, for the people of New Zealand to consider through the political process. I have written it up following the strong response of the Ardern, or Sixth Labour, government to the COVID-19 pandemic. This blog is not to debate whether the response chosen by the Government, and similar responses by many governments around the world, were wise or foolish in the abstract. But the ability of the Government to take the courses it did revealed, in my opinion, real and seris defects in New Zealand's political and constitutional framework. I outline possible measures to improve that framework, philosophical and practical, in the following posts, which will be linked to on this page as I write them. End Parliamentary Sovereignty Establish fundamental rights of individuals, families and households Introduce the Optional Preferential Party Vote Give a firm constitutional basis to the highest court Re-establish trial by jury for most criminal matters